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Abstract—This paper proposes a train timetabling model for 
shared railway systems. The model is formulated as a mixed 
integer linear programming problem and solved both using 
commercial software and a novel algorithm based on approximate 
dynamic programming. The results of the train timetabling model 
can be used to simulate and evaluate the behavior of the 
infrastructure manager in shared railway systems under different 
capacity pricing and allocation mechanisms. This would allow 
regulators and decision makers to identify the implications of 
these mechanisms for different stakeholders considering the 
specific characteristics of the system.   
Keywords—shared railway corridors; capacity pricing; capacity 
allocation; train timetabling problem for multiple operators 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Infrastructures supporting basic essential service should be 
put in place to enable economic activity, economic growth, and 
development [1], [2]. However, investment in new infrastructure 
is extremely expensive and not always feasible, especially in 
densely populated areas with the most critical infrastructure 
needs.  
This research analyzes this complex socio-technical problem 
in an attempt to reduce infrastructure needs by more efficient use 
of existing infrastructure. In this paper we look at this problem 
from the prospective of rail infrastructure, which is especially 
interesting for two reasons: 1) rail is an infrastructure-intensive 
industry: infrastructure represents around 40-60% of the final 
transportation cost, and 2) there are high interdependencies 
between the infrastructure capacity and its operation [3].   
In the last 15 years, different countries have promoted the 
use of shared railway systems that allow independent operators 
to access the infrastructure. This enables higher levels of 
infrastructure utilization [4]. However, shared railway corridors 
require coordination between the infrastructure manager –
typically the owner of the infrastructure– and multiple train 
operators [3]. This coordination involves determining which 
trains can access the infrastructure at each time (capacity 
allocation) and the access price they need to pay (capacity 
pricing). 
According to [5] and [6], ideal capacity pricing and 
allocation mechanisms should be reproducible and transparent, 
easy to understand, and non-discriminatory (especially when the 
operators compete in the same market). Simple capacity pricing 
and allocation rules are used in other network industries (such 
as electric power or telecommunication). However, in the 
railway industry, the characteristics of the network and 
operations critically affect the available capacity and safety. As 
a result, the implications for the system of the capacity pricing 
and allocation mechanism even when simple mechanisms used 
in other applications are applied remain unclear. Rail capacity is 
endogenous: it depends on the capacity allocation and has to be 
calculated through the train timetable.  
This paper presents a train timetabling model for shared 
railway systems that would allow regulators and decision 
makers to simulate the behavior of the infrastructure manager. 
This model will explicitly consider network effects to analyze 
the interdependencies between operation and infrastructure and 
to determine the optimal use of capacity (train timetable) under 
different capacity pricing and allocation mechanisms.  
There are several papers that propose mixed integer linear 
programming (MILP) approaches to solve the train timetabling 
problem. References [7], [8], [9], [10] present formulations to 
compute the train arrival and departure times with different 
objectives and constraints. Traditionally, these models have 
been called multi-mode resource constrained project scheduling 
models.  
There is another body of literature also based on MILP 
approaches that formulates the train timetabling problem as a 
multi-commodity flow problem [11], [12], [13], [14], [15], 
representing the final timetable as a collection of nodes and arcs 
that represent possible train arrival and departure times at 
stations. Infrastructure and operational constraints are imposed 
determining subsets of compatible and incompatible arcs.  
With the exception of [14], these models assume that there 
is a single operator trying to schedule trains on the infrastructure. 
Most of the papers also assume that all trains follow the same 
path. This paper proposes a multi-mode resource constrained 
project schedule formulation considering different operators 
using the same infrastructure for different types of services 
(commuter, intercity and freight services) with different routes. 
These additional complexities result in 1) the need to specify 
safety constraints depending on the path of each train, and 2) the 
need for operators to specify the desired timetable with 
flexibility margins to ensure that their trains get scheduled with 
small adjustments in case of a conflict with other operator’s train 
that make the problem harder to solve.   
The research team acknowledges Rafael del Pino Foundation for 
sponsoring this research 
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From a computational standpoint, the size of models 
increases exponentially with the number of stations and trains to 
schedule. To partially reduce this “curse of dimensionality”, we 
also propose an alternative class of solution algorithms using 
approximate dynamic programming techniques [16], [17], [18], 
[19], [20]. It allows us to decompose and solve the problem 
faster while still ensuring convergence to the optimal solution 
within an optimality gap. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 
describes and formulates the train timetabling problem for 
shared railway systems; Section 3 details the implementation of 
the model and shows the main results obtained. Section 4 
discusses some implication of these results for the infrastructure 
manager, for different train operators, for the users, and for the 
regulators under different traffic level scenarios. Section 5 
presents concluding remarks and identifies lines of future 
research. 
II. FORMULATION OF TRAIN TIMETABLING PROBLEM IN 
SHARED RAILWAY SYSTEMS 
The train timetabling problem consists of determining the 
arrival and departure time of all trains scheduled at every station 
in the path of the train. Figure 1 shows the topology of the 
railway system considered throughout the paper. It consists of a 
double-track corridor with 12 stations. The system presented 
captures all the elements required to represent a corridor such as 
the Northeast Corridor in the U.S., where the Federal Railroad 
Administration is now trying to develop a new capacity pricing 
and allocation mechanism to foster rail efficiency. 
Stations 1, 2 and 12 represents main stations in the same 
metropolitan area (for example, Boston), station 3, 4, 5, 9, 10 
and 11 are all in another metropolitan area (New York), and 
stations 6, 7 and 8 are all also in another different metropolitan 
area (Washington D.C.). Five types of services are considered: 
Boston commuter trains travelling around Boston metropolitan 
area (stations 1, 2, and 12); New York commuter trains; D.C. 
commuter trains; and intercity and freight trains travelling 
between Boston and Washington D.C. Intercity and freight 
trains may not stop at every station. Freight trains will travel the 
line at speeds much lower than commuter and intercity trains. 
Intercity trains travel at higher speeds than commuter trains. 
 
Fig. 1. Detailed corridor infrastructure 
Today, around 2,000 commuter trains, 150 intercity trains 
and 70 freight trains travel around the Northeast Corridor every 
day. In practice, most of the conflicts to schedule trains occur 
around peak hours; where the infrastructure manager would 
have to control for conflicts of sets of around 100-250 trains to 
make changes in the timetable.  
There are two main mechanisms to design capacity pricing 
and allocation for infrastructure capacity markets: mechanisms 
that determine the price at which capacity will be offered, and 
let operators decide whether they are willing to access the 
infrastructure or not (price-based, cost-allocation mechanisms); 
and mechanisms that determine the amount of capacity that will 
be offered, and let the operators reveal the price that they are 
willing to pay to use that capacity (quantity-based, auction 
mechanisms)  [21]. Cost-allocation mechanisms are typically 
complemented with priority rules that allow the infrastructure 
manager to decide which train to schedule when there are 
conflicts (multiple operators willing to pay the pre-determined 
access charges).  
The model described in this section represents the behavior 
of the infrastructure manager when an auction mechanism is 
implemented. Under an auction, every few months (with a 
predetermined frequency), the operators will have the 
opportunity to submit bids: list of the trains they want to 
schedule on the infrastructure, the desired timetable for each 
train, and the access charges they are willing to pay to schedule 
each of them. The infrastructure manager will then determine 
the set of trains that can be finally scheduled, their timetable, 
and the access charges that the operators will pay with the 
objective of maximizing its revenue and considering other 
infrastructure constraints (safety, infrastructure maintenance 
plans).  
We also discuss how to change the model to simulate the 
behavior of the infrastructure manager under cost-allocation 
mechanisms. The differences between the infrastructure 
manager models for each mechanism affect mainly the 
definition of the parameters and the choice of the objective 
function. The constraints however are related to the physical 
operation of the trains and remain unchanged for different 
mechanisms.   
The train timetabling problem sets, parameters, variables, 
objective function and constrains are defined below. 
A. Sets 
𝑖, 𝑖 ∈ {0,1, … , 𝐼}  trains proposed by the operators in the 
bidding process 
𝑗, 𝑗 ∈ {1, 2, … , 𝐽} railway system stations 
𝑘, 𝑘 ∈ {1, 2, … , 𝐾} possible types of train services (such as 
intercity, freight, or commuter) 
Each operator has to provide the following information 
about each train 𝑖 in the bidding process: 
𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑖𝑘, a subset that indicates if train 𝑖 is of type 𝑘 
𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑗, a subset that indicates the initial station 𝑗 from which 
train 𝑖 departs  
𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑗, a subset that indicates the final destination (station 𝑗) 
of train 𝑖  
The information about the topology of the line and the type 
of service is used to determine the following two subsets: 
𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑗, a subset that indicates whether train 𝑖 travels through 
station 𝑗 or not 
𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑗′, a subset that indicates for each train 𝑖 the station 𝑗
′ 
that train 𝑖 will visit immediately after station 𝑗. Train 𝑖 may not 
stop at station 𝑗′.   
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B. Parameteres 
The information that the train operators provide in the 
bidding process for every train 𝑖 is: 
𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖, the maximum access price that the operator 
is willing to pay if train 𝑖  is scheduled. For price-based 
mechanisms the access price will be pre-determined (using for 
example a cost-allocation model) and fixed by the infrastructure 
manager depending on the characteristics of the service. It is 
important to note that the operator will only operate a train if that 
price is lower or equal than his willingness to pay. 
𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑗 , 𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑗 , the desired arrival and departure 
time of train 𝑖 at every station 𝑗 in the path of train 𝑖 
𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖, 𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑦𝑡𝑟𝑖 , maximum acceptable translation 
(see figure 2) of train 𝑖  and per-unit penalty imposed by the 
operator if the infrastructure manager translates the train over 
the desired timetable 
Δ𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑖 , 𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑦𝑡𝑡𝑖, maximum acceptable change in 
train 𝑖  total travel time (see figure 2) and per-unit penalty 
imposed by the operator if the infrastructure manager increases 
the travel time of train 𝑖 at any station over the desired timetable 
 
Fig. 2. Possible changes with respect to desired timetable 
In addition, the topology of the track and the signaling 
system will determine the minimum safety headway (time 
elapsed) between consecutive maneuvers at every station: 
ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑤𝑎𝑦𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑗 , ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑤𝑎𝑦𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑗 minimum headway between 
consecutive departures/arrivals from/to station 𝑗 
In some cases the minimum safety headway depends also on 
the characteristics of the rolling stock. If that is the case, the 
former parameters will have different values for different train 
pairs.  
C. Variables 
The decision variables of this problem are: 
𝑆𝐶𝐻𝐸𝐷𝑈𝐿𝐸𝑖 binary variable that indicates whether train 𝑖 is 
scheduled 
𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑇𝐼𝑀𝐸𝑖𝑗 , 𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑇𝐼𝑀𝐸𝑖𝑗  final arrival and departure time 
(timetable) of every train 𝑖 scheduled at every station 𝑗 in the 
path of the train 
𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑆𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖 , Δ𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑉𝐸𝐿𝑇𝐼𝑀𝐸𝑖𝑗  final train 𝑖  translation 
and increment of travel time per station 𝑗 . Note that these 
variables can be determined knowing 
𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑇𝐼𝑀𝐸𝑖𝑗 , 𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑇𝐼𝑀𝐸𝑖𝑗  and vice versa. This research 
assumes Δ𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑉𝐸𝐿𝑇𝐼𝑀𝐸𝑖𝑗 ≥ 0  to ensure that the resulting 
train timetable is feasible. 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑆𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖  can either be 
positive or negative; so the positive variable 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑆𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖
+ is 
defined to compute the portion of the access charge that each 
operator receives from the infrastructure manager in case that 
train 𝑖 is re-scheduled. 
D. Objective Function 
As discussed before, the objective of the problem is to 
determine which trains should be scheduled and when to 
maximize the infrastructure manager’s revenue: 
max ∑ 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑆𝐶𝐻𝐸𝐷𝑈𝐿𝐸𝑖
𝑖
+  𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑦𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑆𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖
+
+ 𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑦𝑡𝑡𝑖 ∑ Δ𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑉𝐸𝐿𝑇𝐼𝑀𝐸𝑖𝑗
𝑗
 
Similar objective functions can be defined for different 
mechanisms.  For instance the functions: 
max ∑ 𝑆𝐶𝐻𝐸𝐷𝑈𝐿𝐸𝑖
𝑖
  
max ∑ 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑆𝐶𝐻𝐸𝐷𝑈𝐿𝐸𝑖
𝑖
 
could be used to maximize the number of trains scheduled or the 
number of priority trains scheduled respectively under a cost-
allocation and priority rules mechanisms. In this case 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖  
would be a parameter that indicates the priority level of each 
train 𝑖.  
E. Constraints 
The first sets of constraints establish the relation between the 
desired timetable and the final timetable of every train 
scheduled:  
The departure time at the first station can be determined as: 
𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑇𝐼𝑀𝐸𝑖𝑗 = 𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑗 + 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑆𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖 , ∀𝑖, 𝑗: 𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑗  
The travel time at intermediate stations can be determined 
as: 
𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑇𝐼𝑀𝐸𝑖𝑗 − 𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑇𝐼𝑀𝐸𝑖𝑗′
= 𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑗 − 𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑗′
+ Δ𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑉𝐸𝐿𝑇𝐼𝑀𝐸𝑖𝑗′ ,
∀𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑗′: 𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑖𝑗′𝑗  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑗 + 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑗 = 0 
At the final station, the travel time can be determined using: 
𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑇𝐼𝑀𝐸𝑖𝑗 − 𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑇𝐼𝑀𝐸𝑖𝑗′
= 𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑗 − 𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑗′
+ Δ𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑉𝐸𝐿𝑇𝐼𝑀𝐸𝑖𝑗′ ,
∀𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑗′: 𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑖𝑗′𝑗  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑗   
Note that the arrival time to the initial station is not defined 
in the timetable; neither the departure time from the last station.  
To ensure that the timetable is feasible, the final stopping and 
travel time at each station have to be greater than the stopping 
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and travel time in the desired timetable:  
𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑇𝐼𝑀𝐸𝑖𝑗 − 𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑇𝐼𝑀𝐸𝑖𝑗 ≥ 𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑗 − 𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑗 ,
∀𝑖, 𝑗: 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑗  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑗 + 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑗 = 0 
𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑇𝐼𝑀𝐸𝑖𝑗′ − 𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑇𝐼𝑀𝐸𝑖𝑗 ≥ 𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑗′ − 𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑗 ,
∀𝑖, 𝑗: 𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑖𝑗′𝑗  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑗 + 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑗 = 0 
Then, the maximum translation and increment of travel time 
are established: 
The maximum translation of a train is bounded by the 
maximum translation defined by the operator: 
−𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 ≤ 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑆𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖 ≤ 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖, ∀𝑖 
In addition, the absolute value of the translation is 
determined using the following constraints: 
−𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑆𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖 ≤ 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑆𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖
+ ≥ 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑆𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖 ,   ∀𝑖 
The maximum change on travel time is bounded by the 
maximum increment on travel time defined by the operator: 
∑ Δ𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑉𝐸𝐿𝑇𝐼𝑀𝐸𝑖𝑗
𝑗:𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑗
≤ Δ𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑖 , ∀𝑖 
The operator may impose additional conditions over the 
acceptable changes with respect to the desired timetable. That 
happens when the operator is not interested in operating the train 
if the departure from or the arrival at one major station is 
changed. In this case, additional constraints are included to 
ensure that the timetable includes the operator requests if the 
train is finally scheduled.  
The final set of constraints ensures that the timetable 
proposed by the infrastructure manager can be accommodated 
in the existing infrastructure.  
Essentially, the difference between the departure times of 
every pair of trains scheduled has to be greater or equal than the 
minimum safety headway, so at least one of the following 
equations must hold: 
𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑇𝐼𝑀𝐸𝑖𝑗 − 𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑇𝐼𝑀𝐸𝑖′𝑗 ≥ ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑤𝑎𝑦𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑗 
𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑇𝐼𝑀𝐸𝑖′𝑗 − 𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑇𝐼𝑀𝐸𝑖𝑗 ≥ ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑤𝑎𝑦𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑗 
The binary disjunctive variable 𝑂𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑖′𝑗  is used to 
automatically activate only one of the constraints depending on 
the value of the other variables. 𝑂𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑖′𝑗 has value 1 if train 𝑖 
departs before train 𝑖′  at station 𝑗 . Although the desired 
timetable can be used to determine the value of some of these 
variables; in general this problem will have on the order of 
O(I2𝐽) binary variables and will be very difficult to solve for 
large I.  
Very similar equations are formulated for inter-arrival times 
too, ensuring also that the order of the trains is preserved in the 
inter-stations. 
Note that these constraints are valid for any shared railway 
system. The information about the topology of the 
infrastructure, the route of the trains, the safety headways 
imposed by the signaling system, etc. is introduced in the model 
parameterization.  
III. IMPLEMENTATION AND RESULTS 
 This section discusses how the train timetabling problems 
proposed has been implemented and solved, and shows the main 
results obtained.  
A. Execution 
The problem has been written in GAMS 24.1.2 and solved 
by CPLEX 12.5 on a PC at 2.40 GHz, 4GB running with 
Microsoft Windows 7 64 bits. Different solver options were 
used to speed the execution. 
In addition, a novel approximate dynamic programming 
algorithm was used to solve the problem. The algorithm 
proposed (see [22] for further details) decomposed the problem 
in different decision stages analyzing the benefits of scheduling 
one train at a time using an adaptive relaxed linear programming 
version of a Q-factor Bellman equation (QARLP). Figure 3 
shows a comparison of the execution time and the iterations 
required to convergence (within 5% integrality gap) of the MIP 
approach and the QARLP algorithm. Note that QARLP 
execution time grows polinomically with the size of the problem 
(number of stations and number of trains to schedule), allowing 
for solving larger problems than the MIP approach.  
 
Fig. 3. Comparison of the execution time and the iterations required to 
convergence (within 5% integrality gap) of the MIP approach and the QARLP 
algorithm. 
B. Results 
Table 1 shows the number of equations, variables and 
discrete variables of a problem with different number of 
commuter and intercity trains. 
TABLE I.  TRAIN TIMETABLING PROBLEM SIZE  
Number 
of 
Trains 
Equations Variables 
Discrete 
Variables 
15 970 510 91 
30 3,715 1,607 292 
60 14,533 5,565 919 
120 57,481 20,537 3,145 
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Figures 4, 5 and 6 show time-space diagrams with the 
timetable designed by the infrastructure manager model for 
different capacity use demand scenarios. The y-axes represents 
distance in miles from station 1 and the x-axes represents time 
in minutes at which different trains are scheduled to pass through 
each point of the line (vs. desired scheduled in dashed line). The 
horizontal segments represents stopping time at stations. There 
is no interaction between trains travelling in different directions. 
Figure 4 shows the timetable for a scenario with demand to 
schedule an intercity train in the system when commuter trains 
around the three urban areas operate every 30 minutes. Figure 5 
shows a scenario where two competing intercity operators try to 
schedule intercity trains at the same time in the system with the 
same commuter demand. Figure 6 shows a scenario with 
demand to schedule a freight train in the system when commuter 
trains around the three urban area operate every 1 hour. The 
conflicts in the desired timetable are adjusted with the model 
(infrastructure manager) as a trade-off between eliminating 
trains and readjusting the desired schedules.   
 
Fig. 4. Timetable proposed by infrastructure manager to schedule an intercity 
train in a system with commuter trains operating every 30 minutes. 
Assuming that each commuter operator pays 1 unit to 
schedule a commuter service and gets a 5% discount over the 
original access fee for every minute their train are re-scheduled; 
the timetable presented in figure 4 involves a 2.1 units of total 
discount for commuter operators (the intercity service will 
initially conflict with 14 commuter trains). That means that the 
infrastructure manager would only schedule the intercity train if 
it represents more than 2.1 units of revenue.  
If the frequency of commuter trains increases, for example 
to one commuter service every 15 minutes instead of 30 minutes, 
the intercity train will initially conflict with 22 commuter trains 
and will only be scheduled if it represents more than 3.6 units of 
revenue for the infrastructure manager.  
Conversely, if the frequency of commuter trains decreases to 
one train every 60 minutes, the intercity train will be scheduled 
if it represents at least 0.3 units of revenue for the infrastructure 
manager. The model can be used to quantify the trade-off 
between commuter and intercity trains for any other frequency 
of service.  
 
Fig. 5. Timetable proposed by infrastructure manager to schedule two 
intercity trains in a system with commuter trains operating every 30 minutes. 
Scheduling two intercity trains in Figure 5, assuming the 
same commuter willingness to pay to schedule trains, involves a 
4.0 units of total discount for commuter operators (the intercity 
service will initially conflict with 14 commuter trains). That 
means that the infrastructure manager would only schedule the 
two intercity trains if they represent more than 4.0 units of 
revenue. If the revenue of scheduling the intercity trains 
represent from 2.1 to 4.0 units, at most one of the intercity trains 
would be scheduled.  
Furthermore, note that although both trains would like to 
depart station 1 at minute 0, one of them will depart at minute 3 
and the other one at minute 8. In some cases, none of the 
operators may be interested in operating a second intercity 
service just 5 minutes after another one. In this example the 
figures show that intercity operators may avoid getting their 
train scheduled just after other intercity by controlling 1) how 
flexible their schedule is, 2) how much discount in the access fee 
they obtain if the schedule of the train is changed, and 3) how 
much they are willing to pay to access the infrastructure.  
 
Fig. 6. Timetable proposed by infrastructure manager to schedule a freight 
train in a system with commuter trains operating every 60 minutes. 
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Figure 6 assumes that the willingness to pay to access the 
infrastructure for a freight operator is lower than the willingness 
to pay of other operators. We also assumed that the freight 
operator’s flexibility (total allowed translation and increment of 
travel time) is higher than other operators’ flexibility.  
For the same commuter frequency, a freight train will 
initially conflict with more commuter trains than an intercity 
train since it travels at a lower speed. As a result, independently 
of how much each commuter pays, the freight train will be 
scheduled if there is capacity as long as the net access fee paid 
to the infrastructure manager is positive. The minimum access 
fee that a freight operator should pay when the line is more 
congested will depend on how many services have to be 
rescheduled to find a feasible timetable. If the commuter 
operator wants to increase the frequency of commuter from one 
train per hour to one train every 30 minutes, the freight train will 
only be scheduled if the net access fee that the freight operator 
is willing to pay represents more than 3 units of revenue for the 
infrastructure manager (since three commuter services could not 
be operated). 
Note that the relative speed difference between different 
services has a major impact on the capacity of the system.  
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR DIFFERENT STAKEHOLDERS 
This section summarizes the results of the timetabling model 
for different operator’s infrastructure access demand scenarios. 
The main implications for the operators, the infrastructure 
manager, the users, and the regulators are presented: 
A. The capacity pricing and allocation mechanism determines 
how different operators are able to compete to access 
capacity 
This effect is important when there are different types of 
operators (such as commuters and long-distance operators) 
competing to access the infrastructure.  
Although the results presented before were calculated 
assuming that the capacity pricing and allocation mechanism in 
place is an auction; note that similar effects happen when other 
mechanisms are implemented. For instance, the results of the 
model demonstrate that intercity and freight services would have 
a disadvantage to compete with commuter trains under capacity 
allocation methods that maximize how many trains are 
scheduled in the system. This problem could be solved by 
designing mechanisms that account for the miles or passenger 
miles, by assigning higher priority to long distance services, or 
by assigning a societal utility to each service. The exact extent 
of these measures should be quantified using the model 
proposed for the specific system.  
Competing companies may be concerned about getting their 
train in the schedule just after another competing train. The 
results for this problem suggest that when the infrastructure is 
congested, bundling two services together also represents a high 
opportunity cost for the infrastructure manager. As a 
consequence, the companies may be able to avoid having their 
train scheduled after another competing train by controlling the 
flexibility of their desired timetable and their willingness to pay 
to access the infrastructure.  
B. The characteristics of the system and the capacity pricing 
and allocation mechanism affects the ability of the 
infrastructure manager to recover infrastructure costs 
The results of the model also show that depending on the 
operators’ infrastructure access demand (like the demanded 
frequency of commuter services) the price that an intercity or 
freight operator will have to bid to be able to schedule a train 
varies considerably. This price reflects the congestion rent. In 
any case, this also implies that the infrastructure manager’s 
ability to recover costs under auctions depends on the level of 
service (understood as the number of train services offered and 
the mix between different types of train services) of the line. 
Therefore in congested infrastructure the costs recovered will 
be higher.  
Although cost-allocation mechanisms are usually presented 
as capacity pricing and allocation mechanisms that allow the 
infrastructure manager to recover infrastructure costs, the 
operators’ demand to access the infrastructure will certainly 
depend on the infrastructure access fee. For instance, the 
operators would require high average ridership levels to provide 
a service when they pay high access charges and vice-versa. 
C. The characteristics of the system and the capacity pricing 
and allocation mechanism also condition the level of service 
experienced by the users of the railway system (passengers 
and freight shippers) 
This implication is a consequence of the previous ones. The 
capacity pricing and allocation mechanism determines how 
different operators can compete to get access to the 
infrastructure and the access charges they will have to pay. This 
will ultimately affect the operators’ infrastructure access 
demand, which translates into how many services each operator 
will schedule. This will have a direct impact on the level of 
service.  
Furthermore, the equilibrium between different types of 
services will also impact the level of service that the users will 
experience: whether it is possible to have frequent intercity 
services, whether it is possible to operate higher-speed services 
in the system, which long-distance services can be operated 
during peak-hours, etc.    
D. Regulator’s design of capacity pricing and allocation 
mechanisms should consider not only overarching 
regulation goals but also the specific characteristics of the 
railway system 
This paper shows that the implications of the capacity pricing 
and allocation mechanism for the operators, the infrastructure 
manager, and the users strongly depend on the characteristics 
of the system. As a consequence, regulators should consider 
these characteristics to analyze if overarching regulation goals 
such as mix of services, level of infrastructure cost recovered, 
and level of service are met.   
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
This paper proposes a train timetabling model for shared 
railway systems. The model is formulated as a mixed integer 
linear programming problem and solved both using commercial 
software and a novel algorithm based on approximate dynamic 
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programming. The results of the train timetabling model can be 
used to simulate and evaluate the behavior of the infrastructure 
manager in shared railway systems under different capacity 
pricing and allocation mechanisms. The main conclusions of the 
paper are: 
1) The capacity pricing and allocation mechanisms impact 
the operations on a shared railway system for all the 
stakeholders: it determines whether the infrastructure 
manager will be able to recover costs; it determines how 
operators offering different or competing services will be 
able to compete to access the infrastructure; and hence it 
ultimately determines the level of service that will be 
offered to rail users.  
2) The extent of this impact depends on the characteristics 
of the system and the traffic level.  
The use of models as the one presented in this paper would 
allow regulators and decision makers to understand the 
implications of different capacity pricing and allocation 
mechanisms in particular shared railway systems.  
This research simulates the optimal behavior of the 
infrastructure manager under a capacity pricing and allocation 
mechanism. It also assumes the characteristics of the railway 
systems and the operators’ infrastructure access demand 
(characterized both as the demand to schedule trains and the 
revealed willingness to pay to access the infrastructure). 
However, the operator’s infrastructure access demand depends 
strongly on the capacity pricing and allocation mechanism. 
Further research will integrate the infrastructure manager 
model with an operator model to better quantify the trade-offs 
between utilization and level of service on the one hand, and 
infrastructure cost recovered under different capacity pricing 
and allocation mechanisms. These results will be valuable to 
design and evaluate appropriate capacity pricing and allocation 
mechanisms aimed at the particular characteristics of a specific 
shared railway system.  
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